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Abstract
Using well-known results from public debt dynamics, it is shown that
in case of degrowth a sustainable public debt is very unlikely to achieve.
Degrowth requires that negative real interest rates have to be maintained
which might imply accelerated inflation, or other severe goal conflicts of public
finance will result.
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1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate whether a sustainable economic development within the
boundaries of the natural environment might be possible even with positive growth
rates (“green growth”). From both, theoretical and empirical perspectives, many
authors are skeptical and advocate zero growth or even degrowth (see e.g. Ayres
(1996), Daly (2013), Mart´ınez-Alier et al. (2010)). An excellent critical review of
this debate is provided by Van den Bergh (2011). There is not much literature about
the economic implications of degrowth for the functioning of governmental policies
such like social security system or public debt management (see. e.g. Malmaeus and
Alfredsson (2017)). This paper aims to point to substantial goal conflicts of degrowth
with sustainable public finance which arises from quite simple debt dynamics.
Sustainable public finance is here simply defined as the government’s ability to
permanently serve the public debt so that the debt/GDP ratio remains stable. In
the European Monetary Union it is determined in the Maastricht treaty that this
ratio should not exceed 60%. A permanently increasing ratio implies that there is
the danger of Ponzi financing public expenditures, and finally getting overindebted
so that a country defaults. At the first sight, it seems intuitive that at any GDP
level a constant debt/GDP ratio could be maintained. Degrowth seems not to be an
obstacle for sustainable public debt per se as long as the debt stock declines with the
same rate as the GDP. However, it is shown that this implies permanently negative
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real interest rates. Moreover, in a shrinking economy (or even with zero growth but
technical progress) one could expect that the real return of capital is increasing. To
keep the real interest rate below zero, increasing inflation rates are necessary which
will harm the economy and are not an indicator of sustainable development. In
case of positive real interest rates, however, a constant debt/GDP ratio could be
maintained only with a very harsh austerity policy which has permanently to be
adjusted to the needs of public debt management, and thus creating huge potential
for goal conflicts.
2 Some simple debt algebra
The following debt dynamic algebra is very basic and can be found in a similar
form in textbooks like Carlin/Soskice (2015). A much more sophisticated algebra
is provided by Escolano (2010) in the IMF technical notes, but with similar results.
For the purpose of this paper, I will use the simplest version in order to derive the
well-known relationship between real interest and growth rate which is a pivotal
issue for the stability of the public debt. We start with defining the public debt
services in period t:
DSt = itDt + repayt (1)
with it as the interest rate (more precisely the average interest rate of all kind of
public debt contracts with different maturities: current yield), Dt as the debt level,
and repayt as debt repayments in period t.
Total debt then evolves according to
Dt+1 = Dt − repayt + dt (2)
where dt is the budget deficit in period t (see below).
The primary budget surplus is defined as
PBSt = Tt −Gt (3)
with Tt as the tax revenues, and Gt as the governmental expenditures, excluding
the debt services.
The budget deficit is then
dt = DSt − PBSt (4)
The tax revenues are seen as proportional to the nominal GDP:
Tt = taxtYt (5)
with Yt = PtY
real
t as the nominal GDP, and the average tax rate taxt as a policy
variable.
Nominal growth is simply defined as
Yt+1 = (1 + gt)Yt (6)
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with gt = g
real
t + pit as the nominal growth rate, and pit as the inflation rate.
Combining all equations (1) - (5) leads to the well-known dynamic equation for the
total debt:
Dt+1 = (1 + it)Dt − taxtYt +Gt
and defining Qt = Gt/Yt as the public expenditure share of the GDP
= (1 + it)Dt + (Qt − taxt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zt
Yt (7)
Equations (6) and (7) constitute a linear dynamic system. As we are interested in
the stability of the debt/GDP ratio qt = Dt/Yt, we can divide eq. (7) by (6) and
obtain the dynamic equation
qt+1 =
1 + it
1 + grealt + pit
· qt + Zt (8)
which has a steady state solution q∗. Let us assume that the steady state is eco-
nomically meaningful, i.e. q∗ > 0. The stability of a steady state requires a negative
eigenvalue of the equation:
1 + it
1 + grealr + pit
< 1 ⇐⇒ it − pit = rt < grealt
so that the dynamics globally converge to the steady state (see figure 1, left panel).
However, this stability condition implies that degrowth or even zero growth (grealt ≤
0) requires a negative real interest rate rt.
qt+1
qt
45◦
q∗
Zt
qt+1
qt
45◦
q¯
Zt
Figure 1: Stability of the steady state
Even if the eigenvalue of the dynamic equation is less than one, it does not guarantee
that the steady state level q∗ is at its politically desired level q¯, e.g. 60%. In order
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to achieve a predefined level q¯, the governmental tax and expenditure policy, as
expressed in Zt, has to be adjusted accordingly by solving eq. (8) with qt+1 = qt = q¯:
Zt =
grealt − rt
1 + grealt + pit
q¯ (9)
which is negative in case of degrowth (grealt < 0).
If we accept the standard assumption that physical capital has declining marginal
returns and/or assume that technical progress enlarges the marginal productivity of
capital and therefore the real interest rate, one could push down this rate only by
accelerating inflation rates. This cannot seriously be a goal of economists who are
interested in sustainability. The real interest rate can be influenced – but not be
determined – by the central bank. It is an endogenous outcome of financial mar-
kets which are partially driven by real developments (such like technical progress),
changing risk perceptions, central bank policy, among other determinants. The goal
of central banks is typically to keep the inflation rate on an optimal level, not to
spur inflation because it is needed to achieve negative real rates for managing public
debt.
Empirically we see a trend of declining productivity growth and also declining real
interest rates in the USA, Japan, and Europe which could be seen as symptoms
of a “secular stagnation” (see Sajedi and Thwaites (2016)). Therefore, it might be
possible to see negative real interest rates permanently. However, even the current
rates are significantly above the level which is needed if we would have degrowth of
e.g. 1% per annum. Moreover, it is by no means clear whether this trend is pursued.
So let us consider the case of positive real interest rates and thus an unstable steady
state q¯ which means an eigenvalue larger than one (see figure, right panel). Policy
variables in this simple algebra are taxt and Qt or simply Zt which can be interpreted
as a measure of budget discipline or austerity: increasing Zt imply less discipline,
declining Zt indicates austerity policy. However, Zt determines the intercept in
equation (8) and has thus no impact on the stability of a steady state. The only
way to maintain a certain level of q¯ > 0 is a harsh austerity policy with Zt < 0
(see equation (9) and right panel of graphic) which is then permanently adjusted
according to fluctuations of Yt, it, g
real
t , pit which then results in fluctuations around
q¯. Permanent adjustments are necessary because q¯ is unstable and therefore a
misalignment could lead to a “debt trap” of permanently increasing q levels and
finally to overindebtedness and default.
3 Conclusion
A harsh austerity policy where expenditures and taxes are determined by the re-
quirement of eq. (9) is supposedly not the desired political prospect which pro-
ponents of degrowth might have. There are not much leeways anymore to adjust
taxes and expenditures according to economic or ecological needs. Thus, we can
conclude that degrowth imposes severe goal conflicts because negative real interest
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rates (and thus eventually accelerating inflation) in case of a negative eigenvalue
or harsh austerity policy in case of positive eigenvalues are necessary to maintain a
certain public debt/GDP ratio. Especially in case of an ecological tax reform where
the tax base might fluctuate in time, this could be a very difficult task with a lot of
trade-offs. On the other hand, an ecological tax reform would also break the strong
tie between GDP and tax revenues (see eq. (5). A shrinking economy with stable
eco-tax revenues is at least possible from a technical point of view. But this implies
an increasing tax burden per unit of income which also has its limits. Moreover, the
purpose of eco-taxes is to provide an incentive for a shrinking tax base which will
enforce the goal conflicts discussed in this paper.
If drastic austerity should be avoided, it is necessary to set the politically deter-
mined goal q¯ close to zero (nearly no public debt). Even with q¯ = 0 a permanent
adjustment of Zt will be required in case of positive real interest rates but the fiscal
pressure might be minimized. However, this would nullify nearly all financial secu-
rities (sovereign bonds) in the banking sector and thus leading to inherent financial
instabilities as these securities play an important role as a collateral, for liquidity
transfers, and for hedging risks. It should be emphasized that pointing to goal con-
flicts in case of degrowth is not automatically a plea for positive growth rates. But
it highlights the dependencies of public policy on growth.
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